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Abstract 
Techniques of governance in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan do not follow a single or 
unifying logic. Despite a more than decade-long shift towards a neoliberal orientation, 
market-disciplinary policies coincide with important exceptions. This article employs a 
modified variegated neoliberalization approach to explore one such exception. 
Specifically, it analyzes the recent debate over the country’s bread subsidy to elucidate 
key elements of Jordan’s socio-economic transformation. The persistence of this long-
standing welfare program is linked to the uneven pathways of Jordanian 
neoliberalization and two potent political rationalities imbricated in this process. 
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Scholars have frequently described neoliberal economic reforms in the Middle 
East as the concerted reaction of apprehensive authoritarian elites to external pressures 
and domestic economic crises. Faced with fiscal predicaments brought on by declines in 
commodity prices, labor remittances and a stagnant model of state-led development, 
various governments enacted drastic changes throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Authoritarian incumbents endorsed what was once a set of unthinkable economic 
reforms, including cuts in politically sensitive welfare programs. These policies were 
shaped, although not wholly determined, by the requirements of international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and the preferences of elite economic networks in each country. Over 
time, policymakers increasingly stated their mistrust in state interventionism, preferring 
in its wake the creeds of privatization, finance capital and the free market to deliver both 
economic growth and higher living standards. Market fervor slowly traveled from 
Santiago and London to Cairo and Beirut. Much of what this typical broad-sweep story 
tells us is true, yet the danger lies in how it can lead to an over-generalized account of  
socio-economic transformations in the region. Political struggles, policy outcomes and 
the institutional-historical circumstances that shape the implementation of pro-market 
measures appear as the mere consequence of global capitalism or authoritarian designs, 
rather than as active historical processes. Although pro-market reform has been guided by 
a series of extensively discussed principles, such dogmas have been erratically and 
unequally applied (Peck and Theodore, 2012). Their implementation has been selective, 
strategic and far from uniform (Bergh, 2012; Zemni and Bogaert, 2009). Contemporary 
forms of governance and rule, as well as the struggles that shape them, are far more 
composite than prevalent theoretical frameworks would suggest.  
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In Jordan, market-disciplinary reforms did not lead to the state apparatuses 
curtailment or disappearance but rather to a reorganized institutionalization of its forms, 
which had important implications for an array of public policies (Debruyne, 2013; 
Hourani, 2014a). This article highlights a concrete example of this process. Specifically, 
it examines the Jordanian government’s bread subsidy, asking why, amidst the 
contraction of welfare expenditures and the implementation of other pro-market 
measures, the government still subsidizes the price of bread. In addition to shedding light 
on a key issue in Jordanian politics, the recent debate over this welfare program 
problematizes predominant statist-institutionalist accounts of the economic reform 
process in the Hashemite Kingdom. These works often link pro-market policies to a 
broader telos documenting neoliberalism’s smooth implementation or unfortunate 
distortion by entrenched economic interests (al-‘Afif et al, 2013; El-Anis, 2010; Knowles, 
2005; Ryan, 2011; al-Sarhīd, 2008; Wils 2004). In contrast, this article seeks to extend 
scholarship that scrutinizes how not-so-neoliberal practices intersect with the expansion 
of market-oriented spaces and techniques of governance in Jordan (Daher, 2013; 
Debruyne, 2013; Hourani, 2014b; Parker, 2009; Schwedler, 2012).  It does so by 
exploring the relationship between two potent political rationalities and one important 
welfare program.  
This essay begins by introducing the theoretical framework it employs. It then 
sets out with a brief sketch of Jordan’s economic reform process. It explores the 
ideological tenets and values at the heart of Jordan’s neoliberal project, while tracing the 
role of pro-market rhetorics in King Abdullah II’s expansive reform experiment. The 
article then details the ‘fuzzy’ yet potent discourse of ‘Hashemitism’ deployed by the 
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monarchy and its allies (Frisch, 2002: 86-103; Nanes, 2010: 162-195). After briefly 
outlining Jordanian food policy and the government’s long-standing subsidy of flour, I 
examine recent debates concerning this welfare program, witnessed firsthand during 
eighteen months of fieldwork in the country. Faced with opposition from a variety of 
groups, proposed reforms to the universal subsidy of Al-Muwahhad wheat flour, 
popularly known as the ‘bread subsidy,’ have been continually postponed. Despite links 
to projects of capitalist accumulation and continual prodding by IFIs, changes to the 
program have been abandoned, while other pro-market reforms have been implemented. 
The political and rhetorical commitments engendered by “Hashemitism” are crucial to 
understanding this outcome. I conclude by discussing the advantages of analyzing 
neoliberalization as a process, one characterized by contingent pathways and anomalous 
policy outcomes that merit close attention.  
Reconciling Political Economy and Neo-Foucauldian Approaches 
Drawing upon the variegated neoliberalization approach (Brenner et al, 2010), I 
will use the bread subsidy to explore how techniques of government associated with 
neoliberalism are being recombined with other forms in fractured governmental 
ensembles (Collier, 2009). By thinking through neoliberalization as process rather than 
outcome, this approach more fully incorporates the historical legacies, institutional 
frameworks and political struggles that mold market-disciplinary reforms through 
practices of articulation and implementation (Springer, 2011). It also provides the 
analytical space through which to examine ‘exceptions to neoliberalism,’ those domains 
or policy sectors that resist, or lie outside, market-disciplinary logics (Ong, 2006: 3). 
While the sovereign exception, as conventionally understood, marks out excludable 
 5 
subjects or spaces that are denied juridical protections, Ong (2006: 3-5) argues that they 
can also mark a positive decision to include. In Jordan, certain exceptions to 
neoliberalism reinforce erstwhile modes of patronage beneficial to elite networks (Wils, 
2004) or the military (Yom, 2013: 132). Others, such as discounted heating oil and 
subsidized bread, work to ensure basic levels of welfare amongst the country’s poor 
majority. In either case, these exceptions are as important to understanding 
neoliberalization and Jordanian politics as the market-disciplinary techniques they elude 
or defy.  
To better examine why these exceptions persist and how they operate, the 
variegated approach is combined with an analysis of political rationalities and their 
purchase on public policy. These political rationalities are not equivalent to an ideology 
conjured to mask class interests nor are they clear-cut product of economic creeds 
transposed onto the political. Rather, they offer a ‘specific form of normative political 
reason organizing the political sphere, governance practices and citizenship,’ while 
regulating what is intelligible in these domains (Brown, 2006: 693; Foucault, 1988). In 
relating these approaches, I endeavor to promote conversation between variegated 
neoliberalization, largely rooted in political economy, and neo-Foucauldian treatments of 
neoliberalism, which focus on political rationalities and the subjectivities they help shape 
(Peck, 2013; Springer, 2012). Rather than as ideological project, policy program or 
contextually specific assemblage, this amalgam can coalesce around an analysis of 
neoliberalization as a mutable and variegated process that circulates a market-disciplinary 
project ‘through the discourses it constructs, justifies and defends’ (Springer 2012: 135). 
This allows scholars to avoid reverting to an assumed real-world referent to recognize 
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material forms that ‘are both constituted by and constitutive of discourse’ (Springer, 
2012: 143). Materiality and discourse become mutually embedded and integral, a shared 
space where poststructuralist and Marxian political economy approaches can come 
together, even if only momentarily. Most importantly, this combination elucidates 
dynamics that are crucial to understanding Jordan’s socio-economic transformation. 
Jordan’s Modality of Neoliberalization 
Faced with an unprecedented fiscal crisis and no longer able to service its foreign 
debt obligations, Jordan’s government turned to IFIs for budgetary relief and capital 
investment in 1988. Negotiations resulted in an IMF-backed structural adjustment 
program (1989) that included liberalizing interest rates and trade regulations while 
decreasing government employment and welfare expenditures. Subsequent reforms 
transformed the Jordanian economy in ways that threatened the underpinnings of the 
Hashemite regime, based as it was on a bloated bureaucracy, an oversized military and a 
targeted welfare system aimed mainly at poor urban neighborhoods and rural 
governorates in the south (Baylouny, 2008: 278). As the state’s distributive 
responsibilities were scaled back, public unrest became a more frequent occurrence in the 
traditionally loyal but welfare-reliant East Bank hinterlands (Ryan, 1998). Liberalization 
efforts, both political and economic, were molded to fit the regime’s survival strategy 
(Greenwood, 2003). In return for the opposition’s acceptance of the supremacy of the 
monarchy, greater political participation was permitted, an agreement formalized in the 
1991 National Charter. At the same time, potentially damaging economic reforms were 
devised to minimize discontent. Through calculated steps meant to appease foreign 
donors, the Palace and allied elites gradually restructured the economy while securing the 
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funds necessary to fuel patronage networks vital to their support base (Baylouny, 2008: 
298-302; Moore and Peters, 2009: 274-278).  
Convinced by IFI’s and the captivating neoliberal ethos celebrated at the time of 
his coronation in 1999, King Abdullah II expanded the once cautious economic reform 
program.  In contrast to 1989, when austerity measures responding to the Jordanian 
Dinar’s collapse were very much an expedient imposed by foreign donors, pro-market 
policies are now the regime’s policy of choice. The Jordan-US Free Trade Agreement 
and the country’s accession to the WTO in 2000 were Abdullah II’s first official steps in 
consolidating his preferred model of development (World Bank, 2012a). Ever since, and 
with the aid of a cadre of allied young technocrats, regime rhetoric openly emphasizes the 
country’s increased reliance on finance capital, as well its desire to ease regulatory 
controls and accelerate the privatization of public enterprises (Daher, 2013; Debruyne, 
2013:153-157; Hourani 2014a; Bank and Schlumberger 2004). Through these and others 
pro-market measures, the monarchy promotes a private sector-led economic boom 
(MOPIC, 2011; World Bank, 2012a). Jordanian government bodies, including those 
concerned with social development and welfare, have fully adopted the new vocabulary. 
Ministries and ministers argue that inequality is best remedied through ‘cooperation with 
the private sector,’ which should take on ‘further social responsibilities,’ especially in the 
realms of ‘rehabilitation and training’ (MSD, 2009).1 Official documents acknowledge 
poverty yet propose ‘improving service delivery’ and ‘expanding access to finance’ as the 
necessary solutions (MOPIC, 2011; MSD, 2009). Empowering entrepreneurs is described 
as key to poverty reduction (GoJ, 2013; MOPIC, 2011). Jordanian citizens are told they 
                                                 
1
 Interview, Dr. Ummaya Toukan, Finance Minister of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 30 
June 2014, Amman. 
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merely need access to the market; their poverty is not a result of structural inequalities 
but ‘the difficulties of access to finance in Jordan’ (GoJ, 2013: 146). 
Dissemination of this neoliberal political rationality starts at the top. 
‘Opportunities are ripe,’ the King told the World Islamic Economic Forum in October 
2013, Jordan has ‘the regulatory environment aimed at helping opportunity grow’ 
(Abdullah II, 2013a). The Palace promotes development by offering ‘attractive 
incentives, economic development zones, business parks, industrial, free zones and more’ 
(Abdullah II, 2013a). State institutions, by way of official documents and civic education 
textbooks, claim responsibility merely for enabling the private sector (al-‘Afif et al, 2013: 
107; MOPIC 2011; al-Sarhīd, 2008). The government’s role is limited to providing ‘a 
market oriented financial and credit policy environment,’ leaving to the private sector the 
development of services that will respond ‘to the demands of the economically active 
poor’ (MOPIC, 2005: 8). Ministries are told to minimize transaction costs for globally-
mobile investors, who they serve over and above the public (MOPIC, 2011). Public 
agencies, formerly regulatory and interventionist, have become ‘entrepreneurial’ (Parker, 
2009: 114).  
The monarchy’s development rhetoric aggrandizes the private sector and 
celebrates its involvement in policy decisions. The potentially authoritarian implications 
of this shift are obfuscated by the supposed imperatives of meeting global market 
requirements (Parker, 2009: 117). Unpopular economic policies are justified by blaming 
their implementation on inescapable global forces (Abdullah II, 2013b; al-Sarhīd, 2008: 
88-95). Ministries, agencies and official institutions can then leverage state power to 
implement supposedly indispensable market-disciplinary measures, against the claims of 
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participatory citizenship (Parker, 2009). In a speech to Parliament in November 2013, the 
King reminded those present of the need to implement the principles of the socio-
economic approach the Palace has devised. Development requires Parliament to ‘fully 
cooperate and rise to the level of such responsibility,’ for grave challenges face the 
country in light of the ‘international and regional crises that affect our economic 
situation’ (Abdullah II, 2013b). In this way, policy questions are divorced from 
participation; the regime makes economic reforms seem technically and politically 
neutral, as well as necessary. The monarchy’s circulation of a neoliberal political 
rationality is crucial to this sometimes (un)successful obfuscation.  
Despite the Palace’s best efforts, the pro-market shift has not been an 
unadulterated success. Excessive concern with inflation, fiscal deficits and other 
macroeconomic indicators combined with poorly planned trade and financial 
liberalization has enriched holders of capital while increasing inequality. The poor 
majority has been the hardest hit by these changes, followed by the wage-dependent 
middle class, whose living standards have declined sharply over the last fifteen years 
(Baylouny, 2008: 295-296). To their disappointment, growth is unevenly distributed. It is 
driven predominantly by an expansion in non-tradable activities such as construction and 
an enclave export sector established under American aegis (Harrigan et al, 2006). Yet 
still, the pro-market shift has not affected all sectors. Although neoliberalization has led 
to decreased spending on health care, education and other social services, substantial 
cutbacks have not been imposed on the key bodies staffed by regime supporters, the 
notion of ‘laying off bureaucrats or downsizing the army remains taboo’ (Yom, 2009: 
156). Notwithstanding the monarchy’s avowed aspirations, Jordan is not a paragon of 
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free-market capitalism but rather a kleptocratic system characterized by a concerted 
emphasis on military prerogatives, the re-funneling of public expenditures towards large-
scale private investments and a labyrinthine system of patronage that extends from the 
Palace, to Parliament and down through the lowest levels of municipal administration 
(Clark, 2012). Privatization and de-regulation has gone hand in hand with re-structured 
forms of patronage (Moore and Peters, 2009: 274-278). Given the country’s recurring 
fiscal constraints, how is this possible? For more than two decades, publicly upbeat 
interpretations of Jordanian neoliberalization present the Kingdom as a model of reform 
so to justify continued funding for a major Western ally (IMF, 2004; Pfeifer, 1999). Pro-
market reforms, and exceptions to them, are heavily lubricated by generous external aid, 
as Jordan has become one of the highest recipients of American financial assistance in the 
world, which is now being dwarfed by support from the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC).
2
 Despite consistent slippage and delay in implementing IFI dictates, foreign aid 
and budgetary assistance continues to flow into the country  (Harrigan et al, 2006; Yom, 
2015).
3
 For the moment, this support has ensured just enough funds for the regime to 
stave-off fiscal collapse while remunerating the coalitions on whose support it has 
traditionally depended. Geopolitical interests, and the revenues the regime accrues and 
can then distribute as a result, are a crucial element in Jordanian neoliberalization. Yet 
they cannot by themselves explain why certain policies continue to escape reform. 
Pro-market policies do not stand unopposed. Anti-neoliberalism has frequently 
united vastly disparate opposition currents, who denounce recent economic reforms in 
                                                 
2
 For more on the unprecedented amounts of foreign assistance that have entered regime coffers 
since the ‘Arab Spring,’ see Hourani, 2014b; Yom 2015. 
3
 Far more can be said on this topic, but to be clear, the preferences and impact of external actors 
on Jordanian neoliberalization are not singular, but rather, the contingent result of an array of 
inter-connnected agencies, governmental forces and actor-networks (Moore and Peters 2009). 
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favor of re-vitalizing the state’s interventionist role in both industry and social welfare 
(Ryan, 2014; Yom, 2015). These groups are far from uniform. They include pan-Arabists 
of various ideological leanings, Islamists, retired military officers with Marxist leanings 
and more traditional elements. For example, prominent tribal sheikhs as well as the 
influential National Committee of the Retired Military Veterans Association, which 
claims to represent some 150,000 East Bankers, have consistently criticized various 
aspects of the monarchy’s reform project. By virtue of their significant numbers in the 
armed forces, police and bureaucracy, their voices are not easily ignored. They deride the 
lack of government spending in rural areas, reductions in public employment and the 
diminishing quality of social services (Yom, 2015). Nevertheless, most of these groups 
emphasize their political loyalty when articulating their critiques. They deploy 
conceptions of citizenship and monarchical benevolence intimately tied to the regime’s 
own legitimizing rhetoric so as to problematize certain policies. Although these disputes 
came to the fore prominently during Jordan’s ‘Arab Spring,’ the bread subsidy debate, 
and clashes over economic policy more broadly, predate and supersede this critical 
juncture.
4
 Austerity riots, public unrest and vociferous opposition have long forced the 
monarchy to negotiate with various power centers throughout the body politic. A 
uniquely Hashemite political rationality circulated by the Palace lies at the crux of such 
negotiations. 
Hashemetism as Rejoinder 
While pro-market reforms did not bring about meaningful public participation or 
an economic boom, they did powerfully impact the legacies of Jordan’s provisionary 
welfare apparatus. Similar to many of its regional counterparts, the Hashemite regime 
                                                 
4
 For an excellent discussion of Jordan’s ‘Arab Spring,’ see Hourani, 2014b.  
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long relied on a host of redistributory measures to foster societal consent (Massad, 2001: 
219).
5
 Citizens depended upon and came to expect extensive government intervention in 
local markets. Such expectations became embedded in political practices over time. Since 
the infamous April 1989 riots, the most significant public protests in the Kingdom have 
consistently stemmed from poorly planned retractions from welfare expenditures such as 
food subsidies (Yom, 2015). Neoliberal rhetorics are thus hardly in a position to do all 
the political work needed to justify pro-market measures, mired as they are in processes 
that hit at certain long-standing practices in Jordanian politics.  
In response, the monarchy and allied elites have consistently deployed a “fuzzy” 
nationalist discourse that seeks to minimize and contain opposition and unrest (Frisch, 
2002). It has been variously termed “conservative royalism” (Ryan, 2011), or a “peculiar 
version of modern dynasticism” (Shryock, 2000: 59). Nanes (2010: 163-164) usefully 
defines this creed as “Hashemitism,” a government-defined, elite-led depiction of 
national identity that encompasses peoples within the territories the monarchy wishes to 
govern. It is “fuzzy” because it lacks a fixed definition, as it has been continuously 
redefined in relation to key events throughout Jordanian history, such as the loss of the 
West Bank in 1967.
6
 Former Palace-advisor Adnan Abu Odeh (1999:279) defines the 
term as standing for “the inherent equality of being above differences and sub-identities 
within Jordanian society…a single pan-Jordanian identity under the Hashemites.” By 
definition, Hashemitism prioritizes the rule and reign of the current monarchy above all 
else (Nanes, 2010: 164). It functions as a political rationality because it does far more 
than promote false consciousness or legitimize the political status quo, it also involves a 
                                                 
5
 Tunisian scholar Larbi Sadiki (2000) has described this social contract as dimuqratiyyat al-
khubz, or the democracy of bread. 
6
 For an excellent analysis of several of these key historical junctures, see Massad 2001.  
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“specific and consequential organization of the social, the subject, and the state” (Brown, 
2006: 693). It governs truth criteria within crucial political domains and thus enables 
people to be governed as subjects. 
Specifically, Hashemitism promotes order, stability, national unity and 
monarchical benevolence as the underpinnings of Jordanian nationalism and political 
debate. Fearful of social unrest, identity-based divisions and regional instability, it seeks 
to realign conceptions of citizenship. It does so by attempting to restore a sense of moral 
purpose, an assortment of higher order values that implicitly bolster the monarchy’s 
legitimacy and explicitly set the terms of political debate. National attachments and 
patriotic values are rendered as necessary to unite a nation ostensibly threatened by 
internal upheavals and external threats.
7
 This allows the Palace to monopolize the 
language of nationalism and loyalty in ways amenable to its hegemony.  
While internally diverse and ideologically distinctive, Hashemitism is analogous 
to other nationalist and religiously inflected responses to late modernity and market-
disciplinary policies. It is animated by an explicit drive for power as well and anxieties 
linked to the supposed decay of national loyalties and moral values. Much like David 
Harvey’s (2005: 82) depiction of neoconservatism in the United States, Hashemitism 
differs from its neoliberal counterpart in two important ways: first, in its concern for 
order in the face of individual interests, and second, in its desire to impose an 
overweening morality that can bring coherence to the body politic. King Abdullah II’s 
first notable attempt at circulating this rationality can observed in the government-led 
‘Jordan First (al-Urdun Awalan)’ publicity campaign, which coincided with the elevation 
                                                 
7
 For example, prominent voices stress the menacing nature of the recent influx of Syrian 
refugees or Israeli plans to establish an alternative Palestinian homeland in Jordan (Malkawi, 
2014; Nsour, 2013). 
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of pro-market reformers to the highest echelons of policy-making (Bank and 
Schlumberger, 2004). Initiated in 2002, its fundamental objective was to re-imagine the 
form and content of Jordanian identity by consolidating a particular nationalist vision that 
could form the unwavering center of political debate. The $50 million campaign stressed 
the ‘shining link and efficacious bond that enwraps all Jordanian patriots, who see in their 
belonging to their homeland a gateway to their loyalty to the nation’ (RHCJ, 2002). It 
promotes national unity and loyalty at the expense of all other possible attachments, 
emphasizing the pre-eminence of Jordanian interests, as defined by the Palace, above all 
other considerations. 
Faced with neoliberalism’s marketizing impulse and societal divisions that have 
long bedeviled the polity,
8
 Hashemitism attempts to re-articulate and re-prioritize 
Jordanian identity so as to shape the subjectivities of the citizenry. Its provisional 
codification in public discourse and marketing campaigns is immanent to authoritarian 
government itself; it seeks to shape a discursive field that can produce obedient subjects 
while neutralizing opposition to authority. Unsurprisingly, it has been frequently used as 
a frame to criticize movements, political figures or activities deemed undesirable or 
dangerous by the Palace (Martínez, 2016; Schwedler, 2012). For example, in a meeting 
with prominent intellectuals amidst the tumult of the Arab Spring, the King reminded 
those present of their responsibility to be ‘cautious and conscious in our political and 
intellectual discourse,’ eschewing debates that could ‘tear our society apart.’ He stressed 
that: ‘National Unity is a red line as far as I am concerned’ (Jordan Times, 2011). This 
unity implicitly depends upon political acquiescence, ‘without security and stability and 
                                                 
8
 Here I refer primarily to divisions between Jordanians of Palestinian origins and Jordanians of 
Transjordanian origin, all of whom are Jordanian nationals.  
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the rule of law there can be no development, no modernization and no progress’ 
(Abdullah II, 2010). Social stability is portrayed as a supreme good, both economically 
beneficial and politically necessary (Abu Nimah, 2014).  
Hashemitism in its current iteration inter-weaves economic reforms, monarchical 
legitimacy and patriotism, all in the name of the continued existence and development of 
the Jordanian nation-state. Hence, in one speech, the King can claim that he sees 
‘economic reform as a principle aspect of comprehensive reform,’ before adding that, 
‘national unity is a responsibility and one that hangs around the neck of each one of us’ 
(Abdullah II, 2010). Together, these formulations establish a contingent and conjunctural 
‘relation of mutual reinforcement,’ whereby monarchical intervention and authoritarian 
power can be legitimated as crucial to national survival and development (Brown, 2006: 
701). Such rhetoric, which re-emerges hastily and most forcefully at moments of public 
unrest, stands at the forefront of what Schwedler (2012: 264) describes as, ‘the 
reorientation of Jordan’s liberalization project.’ Reform efforts have shifted from an 
always half-hearted focus on political participation towards a prioritization of pro-market 
reforms. Yet still, deregulation, privatization and the implementation of austerity 
measures occur unevenly.  
Both neoliberal and Hashemitist rationalities coincide in their de-democratizing 
effects, devaluing practices of participation and values of social equality in favor of 
market rule on the one hand, and authoritarian power on the other. What appears as a 
contradictory combination at the level of ideas often coalesces at the level of state-
sponsored rhetoric and political subjectivity (Brown, 2006). Nevertheless, important 
collisions do occasionally emerge. While the government has heavily promoted an array 
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of market-disciplinary governance techniques backed by external donors, such as the 
deregulation of foreign investment, the creation of tax-free manufacturing zones and 
reductions in tariffs, it has reluctantly maintained various policies that escape the market- 
disciplinary impulse. By virtue of their importance to Jordanian livelihoods or national 
security, these policies are deemed crucial to social stability and national unity. Chief 
amongst these are disproportionate levels of spending on military and security personnel 
as well as the maintenance of consumer supports for heating oil, water for agriculture and 
Arabic bread. Where economic reforms are deemed potentially troublesome for the 
political status quo, the neoliberal impulse quickly takes a back seat (Schlumberger, 
2008: 630). Indeed, Jordan’s ruling elite has proven consistent in its amenity to re-
configure economic reforms when faced with opposition, especially when it emerges 
amongst members of important constituencies. Neoliberalization is meant to go far 
enough to spark growth and foreign approval, but without putting Hashemite hegemony 
at risk.  
Of course, Jordan is hardly alone in its various departures from neoliberal 
prescriptions. Neoliberalization is an uneven, combined and contested process with a 
particular genealogy, one that makes its relationship and impact upon place-based politics 
and regulatory systems historically and geographically contingent (Peck 2013). What 
merits closer analysis is how exactly policy recommendations promoted by international 
donors, foreign allies and local technocrats are implemented, re-configured or rejected, 
and how, in turn, this relates to incumbent elite power, patterns of contestation and 
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influential political rationalities. Otherwise, we cannot fully understand why ‘Touching 
the people’s daily bread’ was one pro-market reform deemed ‘a step too far.’9  
A Brief History of the Bread Subsidy  
Beginning in the 1960s, policies for the provision of basic foodstuffs were one of 
the many areas in which the Jordanian regime established a social pact with various 
sectors of society. Supply and price regulations first included products such as wheat and 
sugar, subsequently incorporating tea, powdered milk and rice. The state imported many 
basic goods, subsequently setting maximum retail prices to alter market outcomes in 
favor of consumers. This commitment was institutionalized in 1974 with the creation of 
the Ministry of Supply, which became responsible for administering subsidies for 
politically sensitive goods (Andoni and Schwedler, 1996). Over the following two 
decades, receiving a range of commodities at accessible prices became rooted in popular 
expectations. Severe reductions in government spending undertaken at the behest of the 
IMF in the late 1980s led to substantial cuts in consumer support. In 1991, rationing was 
introduced for most previously supported foodstuffs. Due to their political importance, 
wheat subsidies were provisionally lifted only in 1996. The change set off bread riots in 
the city of Karak (August 1996). The price of bread reached twenty-five qirsh (0.33 
USD) per kilogram before the state eventually backtracked. The subsidized price settled 
at sixteen qirsh per kilogram of standard khubz ‘arabi (Arab—or pita—bread), and has 
not changed since.
10
 Today, residents of Jordan are estimated to consume ten million 
                                                 
9
 Interview, Dr. Ummaya Toukan, Finance Minister of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 30 
June 2014, Amman. 
10
 The price of wheat, bread and flour are fixed by the Ministry of Industry and Trade according 
to presets set forth in Law No. 18 of 1998. 
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loafs of khubz ‘arabi a day, averaging around ninety kilograms of bread per person 
annually (al-Qiraleh, 2014).  
Under the current system, the government purchases wheat on the international 
market and sells it to private millers. The latter oversee the wheat’s conversion into 
different types of flour. Only all-purpose unified flour of 78% extraction, known locally 
as al-Muwwahad and intended solely for the production of standard khubz ‘arabi,11 is 
subsidized. Depending on their size and location, bakeries are given subsidized flour 
quotas by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply (MOITS), who reimburses private 
millers for the al-Muwwahad flour distributed to their clients. Khubz ‘arabi is then sold at 
the regulated price of sixteen qirsh per kilogram to consumers. Although the current 
system is crucial to the subsistence of Jordan’s poor and working classes, it also offers 
opportunities for unlawful gain at numerous steps in the supply chain (World Food 
Programme, 2008). Fraud often occurs during the assignment of quotas by MOITS 
employees or during delivery, when distributors may act in concert with flour millers or 
bakers to siphon subsidized flour onto the black market. In addition, certain bakeries use 
al-Muwwahad for more expensive, flour-based goods. Government officials discuss the 
resulting flour wastage constantly. They accuse bakeries of corruption and cite their 
corrupt practices, of which there are no reliable estimates, as the impetus for reform.
12
  
During most of 2013, subsidized flour cost Jordan’s bakers 35 dinars per ton ($49 
USD), while the international market price hovered around 301.5 dinars ($426 USD) 
(Jordan Times, 2013). Maintaining the price of sixteen qirsh ($0.23) per kilogram of 
                                                 
11
 Other varieties of flour are used for the production of cakes, biscuits and more expensive 
varieties of bread. 
12
 Interview, Samer Khouri, Director of Market Control, Ministry of Industry and Trade, 7 April 
, 
2014, Amman; Interview, Dr. Essa Al-Dmour, Director of Internal Audits, Ministry of Industry 
and Trade, 8 April 2014, Amman. 
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bread currently costs around two hundred million dinars ($260 million) a year. As a 
result of continuous fluctuations in international commodity prices, as well as the influx 
of Syrian refugees since 2011, the regime’s distribution of discounted flour has once 
again come under close scrutiny. The World Bank describes the program as one of the 
largest strains on the country’s annual budget (2012a: 50-52). It has encouraged the 
reallocation of public expenditure so to phase out ‘poorly targeted and costly subsidies’ 
(World Bank, 2012b). Yet to its chagrin, Jordan’s authoritarian incumbents have 
repeatedly defended the program and gone to great lengths to avoid any scarcities (al-
Ma‘ani, 2013; Martínez, 2014; Obeidat, 2014). Why has this particular welfare program 
escaped neoliberalization’s seemingly all-consuming sway? Although the outcome was 
not all that surprising, the recent debate on bread policy offers a useful window through 
which to explore how political rationalities impinge upon policy outcomes. The public 
deliberations were both significant and vexing because of how they included older 
languages of state-led interventionism, neoliberal logics regarding poverty and 
Hashemitist tropes concerning stability and national unity. The presentation of the debate 
here is deliberately schematic. It eschews a great deal of nuance so to provide a wide-
ranging account of some of the key issues that subsidized bread brings to the fore. 
The Specter of Subsidy Reform 
Throughout 2013, all indicators in Amman pointed to the government’s 
impending intention to alter the bread subsidy. A new wave of economic reforms 
following Jordan’s agreement to a 36-month IMF $2.06 billion loan in August 2012 
included proposed changes to the consumer support system (World Bank, 2012b). Public 
officials leaked subtle hints on impending changes to the press. After liberalizing fuel 
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prices in November 2012, the government quietly promoted a plan that would use 
electronic smart cards to counteract the lifting of the subsidy (Obeidat, 2013). Only 
Jordanian citizens with valid identity cards would be given a monthly allowance to 
compensate for the difference between subsidized (0.16 JD per kilogram) and predicted 
free market prices (0.38 JD per kilogram). Immediate remonstrations from bakery owners 
and consumer protection groups quickly surfaced. In response, different government 
spokesmen seemed to surface weekly to ensure weary citizens that there would be no real 
rise in bread prices. Changes would apply only to foreigners, a message repeated by 
Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour throughout 2013. Despite the Prime Minister’s 
guarantees, an array of bakers conveyed their incredulity, perplexed at the smart card 
proposal and the details surrounding its possible implementation (al-Da‘jeh, 2013). Key 
members of the military and security services also voiced their opposition. They 
highlighted the potentially de-stabilizing effects on the refugee populations they were 
now in charge of disciplining, or the poor neighborhoods they have often been tasked 
with repressing.
13
  
MOITS, which supervises the purchase of wheat on international markets and the 
distribution of subsidized flour, took the lead in promoting the smart card. Ministry 
officials emphasized the disjunctures in a universal subsidy system that equally serves the 
poor and the rich, nationals and non-nationals. They blame refugees for straining the 
budget through increased consumption or vilify bakery owners and crooked flour millers 
for allegedly corrupt practices. However, no one ever suggested the whole-scale 
elimination of the subsidy. The Ministry promised instead various potential avenues for 
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 Interview, Director of Market Control, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Samer Khouri, 7 April 
2014, Amman; Interview, Riad al-Khouri, Jordanian Economist, 30 April 2014, Amman. 
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targeted re-imbursement of Jordanian citizens; officials displayed a keen sensitivity 
towards bread’s symbolic and political importance. Predominant tenets of 
Hashemitism—social stability, national unity and a benevolent monarchy—colored their 
remarks. The full-fledged marketization of bread prices was deemed problematic. For 
example, then-Senator Hani Mulqi,
14
 emphasized his support for most IMF prescriptions, 
yet argued for leniency in this case. ‘This is bread!’ he stressed, ‘The current situation, 
both regional and domestic, means that we cannot play with the bread subsidy, 
notwithstanding the inefficiencies that permeate the current system.’15 Mulqi’s sentiments 
echo those of the monarchy’s key allies. Hashemitism may help legitimate authoritarian 
practices but it simultaneously makes certain economic reforms problematic. In separate 
interviews, three senior ministers stated that cuts to various welfare expenditures were 
necessary given fiscal constraints. Nevertheless, all three feared potential repercussions 
of bread subsidy reform.
16
 Changing the latter was not problematic due to neoliberal 
techniques it would employ but rather because of how it could affect social stability.  
The neoliberal critique of the bread subsidy is well encapsulated in the columns of 
Fahed Fanek, economist and analyst for one of Jordan’s government-owned dailies, Al-
Ra‘i. Fanek favors the smart card proposal because it offers the best way to target needy 
citizens while putting an end to the ‘extravagance and corruption,’ of the current system 
(2013a). Popular opposition to reform is deemed unimportant or uninformed; reform is 
driven by budgetary prudence (2013b). Neoliberal critiques such as Fanek’s focus on the 
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 Mulqi currently serves as interim Prime Minister in the run-up to the 2016 parliamentary 
elections. 
15
 Interview, Senator Hani Mulqi, 4 May 2014, Amman. 
16
 Interview, Dr. Ummaya Toukan, Finance Minister of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 30 
June 2014, Amman; Interview, Dr. Ibrahim Saif, Minister of Planning and Cooperation of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 25 June 2014, Amman; Interview, Dr. Hatem Halwani, Minister 
of Trade and Industry of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 5 June 2014, Amman. 
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subsidy’s misuse or inefficiency, emphasizing its impact on fiscal concerns. Similar to 
the IFIs conferring with the Jordanian government, they display a market-oriented bias, 
aggrandizing macro-economic indicators over other socially and politically salient 
concerns (World Bank, 2012b). In doing so, Fanek and other like-minded bureaucrats 
disregard the political-institutional landscapes in which economic reforms are embedded, 
as well as the socially constructed forms of value surrounding commodities such as 
bread. Most importantly, their pro-market proposals overlook, or cannot quite 
comprehend, the links between Hashemitism, certain welfare policies and regime 
legitimacy.  
For many on Jordan’s small but vocal Left, subsidy reform is merely another sop 
to the international organizations that seek to rid the state of its provisionary 
responsibilities. Government efforts were variously described as a waste of time, or 
worse, a colossal mistake (Ghneimat, 2013; al-Tuweisi, 2013). Critics depict bread not 
only as a nutritional staple with symbolic meaning but also as one of the last remaining 
elements in the state’s previously wide-ranging commitment to social welfare; their 
preference is for the regime to guarantee not purchasing power but provision (al-Tuweisi, 
2013). The coalition of nationalist and leftist parties criticized the government’s 
adherence to IFI dictates, warning the Prime Minister of ‘the repercussions’ of altering 
the bread subsidy, ‘a basic material in the lives of citizens…especially the poor’ (JDPP, 
2013). For the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party (WIHDA), ‘Bread is a red line 
for all peoples,’ if the subsidy is altered, ‘no one can predict,’ the type of popular 
movement that would arise (WIHDA, 2013). The Islamic Action Front (IAF) has also 
consistently questioned the wisdom of implementing pro-market measures, ascribing 
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moral bankruptcy to economic policies that widen social inequality (Sadiki, 2000). For 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm, bread is a ‘necessary substance,’ the proposed 
smart card ‘is incompatible with Jordanian dignity, which cannot be touched’ (IAF, 
2013). For Suleiman al-Shiyab, head of the IAF’s economic policy committee, ‘the 
problem is not the bakers or flourmillers but the government: better supervision and 
regulation would ensure honest practices.’17 The IAF is not against targeted assistance for 
the needy per se, but is concerned that a corrupt state apparatus subverts the possibility. 
For left wing and Islamist parties, the government’s provisionary role is both sound 
economic policy and a moral obligation. 
The Bakery Owners Association (BOA) offered the most intriguing policy 
position. Tasked with representing the incredibly diverse number of bakery owners 
throughout the Kingdom, the BOA articulated themes of social solidarity and cohesion, 
governmental ineptitude and responsibility, sensitivity to endemic poverty and potential 
class warfare. These tropes were deployed alongside pro-market rhetoric usually 
associated with anti-welfare discourses. For example, the BOA promoted a three-year 
transitional period leading to the gradual elimination of the current universal subsidy, 
arguing that the government should avoid sudden price shocks on the way to free market 
prices.
18
 At the same time, the BOA promotes direct cash subsidies for Jordanian citizens, 
criticizing the electronic smart card proposal as the impossible fantasy of a group of over-
eager ministerial technocrats. The BOA’s President, Abdul Illah Hamawi, explained the 
group’s disappointment with the government in a particularly strident interview in al-Ra‘i 
in early 2014 (al-Jenīnī, 2014). His critique, articulated after intense negotiations 
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 Interview, 9 July 2014, Amman. 
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 Interview, Abdul Illah Hamawi (President of the BOA), 5 November 2013, Amman.  
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throughout 2013, disparages the MOITS for ‘corruption, waste and stealing,’ while 
exposing the bakery sector to great injustices. At the same time, Hamawi voices the 
BOA’s ‘support for the Ministry’s inspection campaign and supervision of the bakery 
sector,’ in theory, while attacking the inefficiencies of government regulation in practice 
(al-Jenīnī, 2014).  
In defending the role of the bakery as well as the politico-nutritional importance 
of bread, Hamawi recurred to certain tropes that were sure to cajole government officials 
immersed in a Hashemitist political rationality. The BOA president emphasizes the vital 
role played by bakeries, which merely wish to fulfill their ‘national and moral 
responsibility.’ By ‘providing the strategic good of bread to the citizenry,’ bakers help 
ensure social peace and a modicum of sustenance amongst Jordan’s poor (al-Jenīnī, 
2014). Yet the BOA is not fully immune to pro-market penchants. To improve the 
distribution of the flour subsidy, the BOA promotes a neoliberal technique, a free market 
in production. It counter-balances this proposal with one not strictly driven by market 
logics, direct cash subsidies for Jordanian citizens. The BOA’s policy recommendation 
seeks to minimize government interference in bakers’ business practices while 
maintaining the purchasing power of the industry’s consumers. Yet crucially, the 
organization’s public interventions are always and everywhere couched in the language 
of Hashemitism circulated by the Palace.
19
 Their desire to uphold national unity and 
social stability were continually emphasized. The BOA’s prominence in the debate as 
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 In more than fifty interviews, various bakery owners consistently described subsidized 
bread as crucial to social peace, bakers as responsible agents dispensing crucial 
government-subsidized foodstuffs while pursuing profits in responsible ways. Of course, 
wide variations in political views and policy preferences existed amongst the bakers, 
which the BOA’s position does not and cannot fully capture. 
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well as its success in de-railing the smart card proposal is intimately linked to this astute 
positioning.  
Throughout the bread subsidy debate, a collection of forces positioned themselves 
against the smart card proposal. Some were consistent parts of broader appraisals of the 
Jordanian regime’s economic policies while others offered a mélange of reasons to 
substantiate their opposition. Faced with this broad yet divided blend of resistance, pro-
market technocrats could not overcome dispositions and subjectivities shaped by a 
political rationality at the heart of regime legitimacy. During budgetary negotiations in 
November 2013, any and all changes to the Kingdom’s bread policy were postponed until 
2015. Interestingly, various government sources indicated that the King himself had 
intervened to end speculation surrounding bread subsidy reform. Fears of popular 
discontent triumphed over the preferences of reform-minded bureaucrats and external 
donors. Astute critics tied the availability of subsidized bread to the dearth of disorder 
and social unrest; proposed reforms were criticized using central pillars of the Palace’s 
own discourse. National unity, social stability and a benevolent monarchy, key tenets of 
the current iteration of Hashemitism, made subsidy reform problematic. In spite of an 
undoubted commitment to a broad set of pro-market macroeconomic policies, 
authoritarian rule in Jordan still depends somewhat on a distorted but enduring system of 
social assistance. Bread remains a necessary exception to the neoliberal trend. 
Conclusion  
Neoliberalism is never simply an ideological dogma, straightforward hegemonic 
project or set of externally promoted policy proposals. The implementation of market-
disciplinary measures is a contested and contingent process that must continually 
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confront variegated institutional, historical and political landscapes. Analyzing 
neoliberalization in this fashion opens rather than forecloses avenues of analysis (Brenner 
et. al, 2010). It puts mutability and unevenness at the heart of its inquiry. This allows the 
situated entanglements of geopolitics, political rationalities and local histories to be built 
into our approaches, and our histories. Once they are denied their utopian end-point or 
their teleological destination, neoliberalization’s pathways can be specified in the 
variegated landscape in which they occur (Peck, 2013: 149). Although hardly a recipe for 
a straightforward methodological approach, the comparative advantage of such close-
focus, low-lying methods is their ability to place socio-economic transformations in 
context, illuminating muddy hybrids while bringing neoliberalism to earth, ‘both literally 
and metaphorically’ (Peck, 2013: 142).   
In the case of Jordan, this approach to would also help scholars analyze the 
seemingly incongruous policy outcomes that continue to defy market-disciplinary 
measures enacted in most sectors. Instead of portraying such policies as the fading 
remnants of formerly statist welfare programs or as idiosyncracies related to Islam or 
culture, a modified variegated approach can help us understand the politics behind their 
persistence. When applied to disparate contexts, this mode of analysis can yield important 
insights, as the prevalence of non-market fixes is hardly unique to Jordan, and should 
direct out attention to the heterogeneous character of regulatory regimes (Li, 2014). 
Techniques of governance should not be ascribed to a singular rationality or political 
project, as they are never uniform, nor are the fractured state apparatuses that propel 
them. For to govern, as Foucault argued long ago, is not to pursue one dogmatic goal, 
‘but a whole series of specific finalities,’ always achieved through ‘multi-form tactics’ 
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(Foucault, 1991: 95). For the moment, the Hashemite regime has successfully 
implemented a comprehensive set of market-disciplinary economic reforms. It has won 
the support of the IFIs, foreign allies and local capital while minimizing the disaffection 
of key members of its support base in an uneasy compromise. Undoubtedly, long-
standing tactics of co-optation (gerrymandered electoral districts, patronage practices, 
selective repression) are a central element in this formula, but equally vital is how 
neoliberalization has been fashioned and formed so as not to endanger the authoritarian 
status quo. The enduring subsidy of khubz ‘arabi is a powerful example of this dynamic 
process. 
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